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The Control of Market Power in ITQ Fisheries
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Abstract   The notion of restricting the amount of quota shares that can be
owned by a single entity (sometimes called excessive share limits or ownership
caps) is almost universal in fisheries managed with ITQs. While there is no gen-
eral agreement on exactly what this means, the focus is normally on monopoly
power and the attainment of management objectives or equity goals. This paper
addresses the monopoly power issue and derives a formula for determining the
maximum percentage any one entity can control before incentives to withhold
production become operative. Implications for general and specific policy
analysis are provided.
Key words   ITQ, excessive share, monopoly.
JEL Classification Codes   Q21, Q22, Q28.
Introduction
The 2006 revision to the Magnuson-Stevenson Act (MSA) stipulates that any Indi-
vidual Transferable Quota (ITQ)1 program developed under its auspices must:
Ensure that limited access privilege holders do not acquire an excessive
share of the total limited access privileges in the program by—(i)
establishing a maximum share, expressed as a percentage of the total
limited access privileges, that a limited access privilege holder is permitted
to hold, acquire, or use; and (ii) establishing any other limitations or
measures necessary to prevent an inequitable concentration of limited
access privileges; [Section 303A(c)(50(D))].
In a study of the previous version of the act, the General Accounting Office has di-
rected NOAA Fisheries to provide guidance to the Councils on what factors to
consider when determining what constitutes an excessive share in ITQ fisheries
(GAO 2002).
The concept of an “excessive share,” sometimes with a different name, is found
in almost all ITQ programs. The exact meaning of excessive share is not clear and it
is not defined in the MSA. However, as evidenced by points (i) and (ii) above, there
are two different interpretations of what it means.
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The first has to do with monopoly issues. This has been called output price ma-
nipulation [OPM] in the literature (Anderson 1991).
The transferability of quota may lead to concentration of quota in fewer
hands. Several countries have therefore imposed ..a maximum holding
restriction to protect against monopolistic tendencies. However, such
restrictions will impair the desirable transferability effect of optimizing the
fleet structure in economic terms as the most efficient operators will be
unable to acquire further quota beyond a set limit (Frost and Lindebo
2003:29).
The second has to do with management objectives or equity concerns. For example:
If, on the other hand, important objectives include maintaining owner
operated fisheries and fishery-dependent coastal communities,
transferability may have to be constrained and greater attention given to
equity considerations in setting upper limits on accumulation, boundaries to
transfer of quota share among communities, and other restrictions (NRC
1999:209).
While there may be more interest in the equity issue, other than noting that there is
likely a trade-off between tighter share limits and the efficiency of harvesting and
marketing, there is little that formal economic analysis can contribute to the discus-
sion. However, the issue of excessive share as it relates to OPM is amenable to
rigorous economic analysis, and this will be the focus of this paper.
At the outset, it is useful to delineate two types of market power. Traditional
market power comes from the ability to control the production of a significant pro-
portion of the output of a product with limited substitutes. Ease of entry of potential
competitors and other issues are also related, but for purposes here, it is sufficient to
focus on the control of capacity to produce. Call this capacity-based market power.
With ITQs and other government-based permit systems, such as agricultural
production control programs, the market power control originates from the restricted
permission to produce a product with limited substitutes rather than the ability to
produce. Call this permit-based market power.
While it may not be apparent, it is easier to address monopoly problems with
permit-based market power, such as an ITQ fishery, than it is with capacity-based
market power. In the latter case, there is always the potential for extra output. The
question is whether more output will be produced if demand and cost conditions
warrant it. There are rules of thumb, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, to
help judge whether a particular industry structure will likely have the power and in-
centives to withhold production. However, it is possible to be more precise in ITQ
fisheries because the total allowable catch (TAC) limits total annual output. The is-
sue is more subtle than how much will be produced. The question is, given a fixed
level of output, will it be beneficial for an individual quota holder to withhold pro-
duction in order to engage in output price manipulation? An entity can withhold
production by choosing not to use a portion of its existing quota share. It can also
purchase quota shares for the purpose of restricting production. The solution is
straightforward in the pure-permit based market power case. It is possible to derive
a formula to calculate the maximum percentage of the TAC, call it s*, that any one
entity can hold without conveying the ability to benefit from OPM. This is exactly
what the MSA mandates.
The paper will proceed as follows. The first section will derive and generalize
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the analysis is altered when ITQ programs are instituted in cases where capacity-
based market power already exists. Except for the sole producer case, it is difficult
to make general conclusions. The final section provides general comments on the
practical use of the s* formula.
General Derivation of s* with Permit-based Market Power
The purpose of this section is to provide a formal analysis of the determination of s*,
the maximum percentage of the quota that can be held by a single entity such that
there will be no incentives to restrict output below the TAC for the purpose of OPM.
Assume a fishery is subject to an ITQ program, and quota shares (QS), denominated
in terms of percentages of the TAC, have been distributed to industry participants.
Each year, annual harvesting privileges (AHP), denominated in units of fish, are dis-
tributed among the participants based on their ownership of quota shares. By
definition, the amount of AHP will always equal the TAC. The discussion will cover
both the market for fish and the market for AHP.
Assume a perfectly competitive market for the fish for a particular fishery. Put
in terms of the above discussion, this means that no one firm has a significant share
of the productive capacity. Let the inverse aggregate market demand curve be:
PP Q DD = () . (1)
The total revenue for any price and cost combination on the demand curve is:
TR Q P Q Q D ( ) [ ( )] . = (2)
The marginal revenue curve for this demand curve is therefore:
M R Q T RQ PQ PQ Q Q DD () () [ () ]. = ∂∂ =+ ∂∂ (3)
For purposes of the analysis, it is necessary to know the marginal revenue of a
single entity that only controls a portion of the TAC. Let Q1, represent the amount of
AHP that is controlled by other owners, which means that the single entity controls
TAC–Q1 units. Assuming that Q1 will be produced each year by the other AHP own-
ers, the residual demand curve facing the single entity can be represented as:
PP Q q DD =+ () , 1 (4)
where q is the production by the single entity beyond Q1. It can range from zero to
{TAC–Q1}. By analogy, the MR for this portion of the overall market demand curve is:
M R Qq P Qq P Qq q q DD ′ += ++ ∂ + ∂ () () [ () ] . 11 1 (5)
The difference between equations (3) and (5) is that the former shows the marginal
revenue taking into account the reduction in price on total market output, while the
latter only considers the effect of the change in price on q, the amount produced by
the single entity.
Let the inverse total supply curve be:
PP Q SS = () . (6)Anderson 28
If a single entity is given a large portion of the total AHP, it has two options. It
can hire other boats to catch fish for the portion of its AHP that it cannot use given
its productive capacity, or it can sell the extra AHP to other producers. Under cur-
rent assumptions, the result will be the same. Assume, for the moment, that the
single entity whose own output capacity is small relative to the total output of the
other firms, chooses to hire others to catch the extra fish beyond its own capacity to
produce. The total industry supply curve represents the price it must pay for a par-
ticular amount. The total cost of obtaining fish is, therefore, equal to:
TC Q P Q Q S ( ) [ ( )] . =
The marginal pecuniary cost of obtaining fish will be:
M C Q T C Q PQ PQ Q Q SS () () [ () ]. = ∂∂ =+ ∂∂ (7)
If the single entity does not control all the AHP, it will be buying fish on the market
after the other producers have produced an amount equal to their AHP. Again, Q1 is
the amount of AHP held by others. The price per unit of fish the single entity must
pay is:
PP Q q SS =+ () , 1 (8)
where q is the amount purchased. By analogy, the marginal pecuniary cost to the
single entity is:
M C Qq P Qq P Qq q q SS ’( ) ( ) [ ( ) ] . 11 1 += ++ ∂ + ∂ (9)
Consider first the extreme case where all of the AHP is given to a single entity.
Given the demand and supply curves and their associated marginal revenue and mar-
ginal cost curves shown in figure 1, the single entity with control over output and
that also acts as a monopsonist in purchasing product to put on the market, all else
equal, will choose to operate at Q, where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal
cost (MC). The important policy issue is the size of the TAC relative to the profit
maximizing level of output. If the TAC is less than Q, then a single owner of all of
the AHP will have incentives to produce the full amount. There will be no output
restriction. On the other hand, if the TAC is greater than Q, as pictured in figure 1,
the single entity will have incentives to withhold production. The policy-relevant
question is how much of the TAC must be given to others such that the modified
MR(Q1 + q) and MC(Q1 + q) curves intersect at the TAC line as pictured in figure 2.
The solution can be derived by equating the expressions for MR’(Q1 + q) and
MC’(Q1 + q):
PQ q q PQ q q PQ q q PQ q q DD SS () () () () . 11 11 ++ ∗∂ + ∂ =+ + ∗∂ + ∂ (10)
Since the desired level of Q1 + q is the TAC, this becomes:
P TAC q P Q P TAC q P Q DD SS () () . + ∗∂ ∂ =+ ∗∂ ∂
Both ∂PD/∂Q and ∂PS/∂Q must be evaluated at the TAC level of output. Solving this
for q and the taking the ratio of q to TAC, after considerable manipulation, leads to:Market Power in ITQ Fisheries 29
Figure 1.  Comparison of Output of Single Entity Controlling 100% of TAC
Note: The full TAC will not be produced.
Figure 2.  The Operational Demand, MR, and MC Curves when a Single Entity is





















The terms eD and eS represent the elasticity of demand and supply, respectively,
evaluated using equations (1) and (6) where output equals the TAC.2,3
Since eD is negative, s* will be positive.  As the difference between the demand
and the supply price increases, s* will increase. That is, all else equal, the greater the
difference between what would otherwise be the short-run market equilibrium level
of output and the TAC, the higher will be the value of s* and the less will be the
concern about potential market power. Likewise, as eD and eS get larger, s* will in-
crease. The calculated value can be greater than 1, which means that given the
parameters’ values, the MR and MC curves for 100% of the AHP intersect at an out-
put lower than the TAC.
Now consider the case where the single entity wishes to sell AHP rather than
hire people to catch fish. The entity will have to decide how many units to sell. Pro-
ducers will be willing to pay an amount equal to PD – PS to purchase a unit of AHP,
which is to say that:
PP Q P Q AHP D S = () – () . (12)
Therefore, the revenue a single entity will receive for selling some or all of its allot-
ted AHP will be:
TR P Q q P Q q q AHP D S =+ + [] () – ( ) . 11   (13)
The profit maximizing level of AHP sales occurs where MRAHP equals zero. It can
easily be seen that the first derivative of the TRAHP function with respect to output is
simply the condition that MR equals MC in the market for fish. See equation (10)
above. Therefore, the s* that is effective for controlling OPM in the market for fish
will also accomplish the same thing in the market for AHP.
The analysis is different for the case where the single entity receives an allot-
ment of AHP equal to a relatively small portion of the total TAC. Here there is the
2 This implicitly assumes that the other producer(s) will always put their (TAC – q) amount of output on
the market, which seems to ignore the possibility of any Cournot duopoly action. Operationally, how-
ever, this is of no concern, because with the TAC and the s* policy Cournot actions are ruled out. For
example, if using the assumption, s* turns out to be 10%, then the smallest number of participants is 10,
which effectively rules out duopoly. On the other hand, if s* is 50%, then there can only be two partici-
pants, but from the definition of s*, neither would have any incentive to restrict output on their own. I
thank Ted Groves and Marty Smith for raising the possibility of a Cournot problem.
3 A reviewer has correctly pointed out that a complete analysis would require the consideration of a
Nash equilibrium, where each entity makes its decision on how much production to withhold based on
its estimate of what other firms will do. This is an important difference, because it means that there
would have to be tighter restrictions because of the implicit collusion. If all firms hold back on the assump-
tion that others will do the same, they can take advantage of the price increase by the total reduction in out-
put. This means that the s* value obtained under current assumptions may not be low enough. However,
given that the correct solution will require information on how many firms will likely be in the game
and their individual supply elasticities, and that this information will likely not be available, the use of
the current formula, knowing that it will be an overestimate, is likely the best that can be done.Market Power in ITQ Fisheries 31
potential to engage in OPM by buying extra units of AHP in order to restrict output
and raise the value of its originally allocated AHP either in terms of production of
fish or the sale of harvesting privileges. Let qr equal the reduction in output that re-
sults from buying one unit of AHP. If q is the originally allocated amount of AHP,
its value can be represented as:
V P Qq q P Qq q q Dr Sr =+ + − [] (– ) – ( ) . 11 (14)
The change in value of the q units due to the purchase of AHP to reduce market out-
put is:
∂∂ = ∂∂ + ∂∂ V q P P qq P P qq rD D r S S r –( ) – ( ). (15)
In this case the relevant policy question is: What is the largest amount of q where
the value of equation (15) can never be positive? Setting (15) equal to zero and solv-
ing for q will obtain that value of q.4
Since  ∂PD/∂q = –∂PD/∂qr and ∂PS/∂q = –∂PS/∂qr , the equation formed by setting
equation (15) equal to zero is equivalent to (10). This means that the s* equation that
applies in the previous two cases, applies here as well.
In summary, in the perfectly competitive case, equation (11) holds regardless of
whether the single entity will be a seller of AHP because it is given a relatively large
portion of the TAC or whether it is given a relatively small portion of the TAC and it can
buy extra AHP in order to raise output price. The policy implication of the s* share limit
is that no one entity should be allowed to control more than that percentage of the AHP
through initial allocation or through purchase of QS or AHP on the open market.
Although equation (11) is a rather convoluted formula, looking at the two ex-
treme cases can make interpretation somewhat simpler. If the demand curve is
horizontal, so eD is equal to infinity, the equation reduces to:
s P P TAC e DS S
* –( ) – . = [] 1  (16)
If the supply curve is horizontal, so the PS equals the constant MC of production, the
elasticity of supply is infinite and the s* equation becomes:
s MC P TAC e DD
* –– ( ). = [] 1 (17)
In the above expression, the critical limit is proportional to the elasticity of demand
and the ratio of proportionality will always be less than one.5 The higher the elastic-
4 In my earlier paper (Anderson 1991), I considered this problem in a more restricted manner and
showed that if a single entity received no AHP in the initial allocation, it would not make sense to buy
more simply for the purpose of withholding production and raising price. If q equals zero, both equa-
tions (14) and (15) will be equal to 0. Unfortunately, I generalized from that specific case and concluded
that it would never make sense to engage in OPM by purchasing AHP. As the analysis in the text shows,
the profitability of OPM by buying AHP will depend, upon other things, on the amount AHP the indi-
vidual holds. The point of the above discussion is to keep that amount small enough that OPM will
never be profitable.
5 While commenting on an earlier version of this paper, Ron Felthoven pointed out that this form of the
s* equation is similar to the Lerner Index, which is a measure of monopoly power (Lerner 1934). The
index, which follows directly from the monopoly profit maximization first-order condition is usually ex-
pressed as (P – MC)/P = –1/eD. The higher the value (i.e., the greater the difference between P and MC),
the greater the monopoly power. The above formulation can easily be transformed to  = –(1 – MC/P)eD.Anderson 32
ity of demand and the lower MC relative to price, the higher will be the value of s*
and the less concern there will be for the possibility of OPM. A more detailed dis-
cussion of this is provided in the final section of the paper.
A Further Look at the Market for AHP
Previous research has shown that when there is a dominant firm in the market for
permits, the equilibrium allocation of permits across firms that results from market
trading will not result in productive efficiency because the marginal cost of produc-
tion will not be equal across firms. This is true for both ITQs and pollution permits,
even though the former are permits to produce the marketable product while the lat-
ter are permits to produce waste products that are jointly produced with market
products (Hahn 1984; Misiolek and Elder 1989; and Anderson 1991).  These results
are consistent with the above. This can be seen by taking a closer look at equation
(7), above. The marginal pecuniary cost to the hypothetical single entity when buy-
ing fish to match AHP permits takes into account the change in the price of fish that
results from the extra purchases. In order to minimize the total pecuniary cost of ob-
taining fish, it will equate its MC with the marginal pecuniary cost of procuring fish,
which means that the TAC will not be produced as efficiently as possible because its
MC will be higher that the MC of the rest of the fleet. This type of market failure
cannot be cured by setting an excessive share limit.
It is important to realize that dominance in the market for permits is related to
the relative productive capacity of the firms involved, but it is not necessarily re-
lated to market power over the price of the marketable output. The most obvious
case is pollution rights. Competitors for pollution permits may not even be operating
in the same output market. Sulfur oxides can be by-products of many dissimilar
products. With fisheries, the output of an ITQ fishery could go into a more general
“white fish” market, the price of which is not affected by the amount produced in
the ITQ fishery. In either case, a single firm’s productive capacity relative to its al-
located amount of permits may be such that it can affect the price of permits when it
buys or sells them on the open market.
Excessive Share Limits with Capacity-based Market Power
In the above analysis, it was assumed that there are many producers, all of whose
production capacity is small relative to the total. Any market power is due to the
control of a significant portion of the harvest privileges, but not to the amount of
productive capacity per se. In traditional market power analysis, it is the relative
balance of productive capacity that provides for monopoly power. How is the above
analysis changed if an entity has market power both because of productive capacity
and because of control of AHP?
The extreme case of a fishery with a single producer is quite straightforward. If
one entity controls all of the available productive capacity, it will operate where the
market MR curve intersects its MC curve. Call this output level Qm. What will hap-
pen if an ITQ program is instituted in this fishery?  If the TAC is less than Qm, there
will be no problem with output restrictions. The single producer will want to pro-
duce the full TAC. On the other hand, if the TAC is greater than Qm, all of it will not
be produced. Both statements are true no matter how the AHP is allocated. If it all
goes to the monopolist, there will be no incentive to change production. If it all goes
to other parties, the monopolist will have to purchase units of AHP for each unit of
output it produces. But it will have no incentive to produce more than Qm units ofMarket Power in ITQ Fisheries 33
output, so it will only purchase enough AHP to produce that amount. Technically,
this means that demand for AHP will be less than supply at a zero price, so the equi-
librium price will be zero. In reality, the monopolist will likely have to pay a
positive amount to obtain AHP, and the actual price will depend upon relative bar-
gaining power. Not giving the AHP to the monopolist will not change the output
level, but it can change the distribution of the monopoly profits.
If there is an excessive share policy with allocation limits and restrictions on
transferability, the conclusions are different. For the sake of discussion, assume an
excessive share limit of 20% is instituted, so the single producer receives that per-
centage of the AHP. The rest is distributed to others and cannot be sold or leased to
the sole producer.6 If the sole producer really controls all of the productive capacity
in the fishery, this would mean that in the short-run at least, only 20% of the TAC
would be produced. A policy to ensure full production would instead, at the theoreti-
cal limit, curb it. However, over time the owners of the remaining AHP may obtain
the necessary productive capacity. This could happen relatively fast, and with only
minor and transitory efficiency losses, if the sole producer owned a fleet of boats,
some of which could be sold. This assumes that the other participants have access to
the necessary human capital. On the other hand, it could take much more time, and
there would be more significant efficiency effects if new and duplicative productive
capacity must be built.
Exactly how this would work with different levels of capacity-based market
power and varying degrees of ease of entry will depend upon the specifics of the
particular situation. A full analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. However, even
at this level of abstraction, it is possible to conclude the following. If there is no ex-
cessive share policy and the initial allocation is based on historical catches,
implementing an ITQ program in a fishery with a significant amount of capacity
market power will actually solidify that power. The market power which comes from
capacity to produce can be transitory, but with ITQs it will be backed up with permit
market power. On the other hand, if the ITQ program is instituted with an excessive
share policy, there is the potential to reduce or eliminate the capacity-based market
power, at least in the long run. In those instances, it will be necessary to resort to
traditional industrial organization analysis to address the problem. The s* formula
will be of little direct relevance. The calculation of s* requires data from ongoing
market conditions.
Practical Applications
While the s* equation is rather complex, its value can be calculated using three pa-
rameters: the elasticities of demand and supply and the ratio of marginal cost to
price, all evaluated at the TAC level of output. Nonetheless, it may be difficult to
obtain estimates of these parameters for practical policy analysis. The problem is
made even more difficult because while the decision on an excessive share value
will likely be made before an ITQ program is implemented, the introduction of the
program will likely change demand and supply conditions through changes in prod-
uct quality, harvesting and processing technology, and perhaps stock size.
Perhaps the potential inability to obtain accurate estimates of the necessary pa-
rameters may not always pose a problem. Consider table 1, which shows the value
of s* for a range of PS/PD and of elasticities of supply when the elasticity of demand
6 Since most initial allocation formulae include catch histories, one might wonder on what basis the
other 80% would be distributed.Anderson 34
is equal to –2. Except for the top left-hand corner of the table, the values are quite
large even for this moderate value for the elasticity of demand. Further, as the fixed
value for the elasticity of demand is increased, this becomes more pronounced. See
table 2, where the elasticity of demand is set at –10.  In the lower right-hand part of the
tables, the s* values are listed as being equal to 1, because the calculated value is greater
than 1. This means that no share limit is required to prevent output reduction.
While the elasticity of demand for a particular fishery is an empirical question,
it is safe to assume that it will generally be elastic. There are many substitutes for
most fish products, including the flesh of other types of fish and sources of protein
from other animals. Further, it should be remembered that the demand curve under
consideration is the one facing the producers in the particular fishery under ITQ
management. That is, there may be an ITQ program for “green fish” in one region
but there may be other sources of the identical fish from other regions. One could
assume that the demand curve facing the producers in the ITQ fishery would be
quite elastic, perhaps even perfectly elastic.
Note that while the left-hand column of the table is the ratio of supply price (Ps
which is the MC of production) to demand price, for practical purposes the demand
Table 1
Comparative Values of s* when the Elasticity of Demand is – 2
Ps/Pd eD = –2
0.9 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15
0.8 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30
0.7 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.47
0.6 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.65
0.5 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.60 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.83
0.4 0.58 0.64 0.67 0.78 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.3 0.78 0.84 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
es  0.75 0.90 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00
Table 2
Comparative Values of s* when the Elasticity of Demand is –10
Ps/Pd eD = –10
0.9 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.36
0.8 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.72 0.77
0.7 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.53 0.67 0.79 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.6 0.44 0.52 0.57 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.5 0.65 0.76 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.4 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
es 0.75 0.90 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00Market Power in ITQ Fisheries 35
price at the TAC level of output will likely be known. The issue will be the size of
the MC because the excessive share limit increases with MC. The reasoning is as
follows. The benefits of withholding production are the higher prices for the remain-
ing output and the cost savings from the reduction in output. Therefore, all else
equal, firms with higher costs will have higher benefits from restricting output and
will require tighter excessive share limits.
Again, while the ratio of MC to price in any ITQ fishery is an empirical ques-
tion, given the ratio of fixed to variable costs in many fisheries, there are reasons to
believe it will not be excessively high and perhaps that it might be quite low. To
make a long story short, it depends upon the vertical difference between the post
ITQ demand curve and the long-run efficient supply curve at the TAC level of out-
put (see figure 2). The larger that difference, the lower will be the MC/P ratio.
From a casual perusal of the two tables and the understanding that the elasticity
of demand will tend to be high and the MC/P ratio will tend to be low, it does not
appear that monopoly restrictions of output will be very likely in ITQ fisheries. It is
an indication that the concern over monopolistic excessive share may be ill founded.
Put another way, the excessive share limits that have been set in real-world fisheries
(20% in New Zealand and less than 1% in the Alaska halibut fishery) will likely pre-
vent any monopoly problems whatever the reason for their implementation.
The above analysis suggests that in the absence of the required parameters, a
useful approach to determining an s* for a real-world fishery would be to come up
with the best estimate of the elasticity of demand and use it to construct a table simi-
lar to those in the text. Unless there is reason to believe that the parameters that
apply to this fishery are in the range where the s* value is less than 1, there is no
need to set a monopoly excessive share limit. In the opposite case, try to come up
with the best rough estimate of the other two parameters and set the s* accordingly
using a conservative approach.
Finally, it should be stressed that the analysis here has focused solely on mo-
nopoly power excessive share limits. Share limits which address fishery
management objectives or equity concerns have not been considered.
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